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1 Introduction
During the last decade decentralized electricity markets have been created in Britain,
Norway, Sweden, the United States, Australia, Argentina, and Spain, to name but a few.
The details differ from country to country, but the different processes of reform share some
common features. These include the breaking up of the formerly vertically integrated
companies; the unbundling of generation, transmission, distribution and retailing; the
reliance on spot markets as a mean to allocate production and determine prices; and the
design of new institutional mechanisms to govern access to the transmission network.
This new form of regulation has raised concerns about the ability of electricity pro-
ducers to exercise market power and its effects on the efficiency of the market. The
recent empirical literature on market power in electricity markets is now vast. The studies
have identified strategic bidding and output decisions by individual firms (Borenstein and
Bushnell (1999), Wolak (2000), Wolak (2003) and Wolfram (1998)) and have measured
the departures of market outcomes from the competitive benchmark (Borenstein, Bushnell
and Wolak (2002), Joskow and Kahn (2002) and Wolfram (1999)). All these studies have
focused on the unilateral exercise of market power, but little attention has been devoted to
analyze collusive attempts to exercise market power in a dynamic context.1 Nonetheless,
electricity markets present several features that facilitate the sustainability of collusion
more than most other markets: trading takes place on a daily basis and it is organized as
a uniform-price auction,2 firms are capacity constrained, demand is very inelastic in the
short-term, and there is typically a small number of players protected by high entry barri-
ers. Both theory and experience suggest that these factors may allow firms to coordinate
their strategies, and hence compete less aggressively with each other over time, through
collusive agreements.
The analysis of the performance of the Spanish electricity spot market during 1998
provides a unique opportunity to perform an empirical analysis of firms’ dynamic inter-
action. The availability of detailed data at the industry and firm level allows to exploit
changes in prices, firms’ market shares and cost fluctuations in order to identify potential
attempts to exercise market power in a dynamic context. Furthermore, an analysis of
this market allows to uncover some of the effects that firms’ contract positions have had
1Puller’s (2000) empirical analysis of collusion in the Californian electricity market is an exception.
2In a model applicable to electricity markets, Fabra (2003b) shows that the sustainability of collusion
is easier in uniform-price auctions as compared to discriminatory auctions.
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on their bidding incentives. The Spanish electricity producers are entitled to receive the
so-called Competition Transition Charges (CTCs) as a mean of stranded cost recovery.
Essentiality, these payments act as ‘Contract for Differences’, given that they are com-
puted as a decreasing function of the market price. From a methodological perspective,
the fact that firms’ shares over these payments are fixed as determined by Law, allows
to overcome the problem of identifying firms’ contract positions as well as the possible
endogeneity of contracts and market outcomes that arises in other contexts.
The time-series of prices in the Spanish electricity market during 1998 is characterized
by the occurrence of five to seven episodes during which prices drastically fall below
their usually prevailing level, in ways that seem to be uncorrelated with demand or cost
conditions. This evidence is inconsistent with models of static bidding behavior (von der
Fehr and Harbord (1993) and Green and Newbery (1992)), as these predict that prices
should be fully explained by demand movements, once the changes in cost conditions
have been accounted for. Further evidence confirms that firms have not behaved so as
to maximize their individual profits. In particular, the mark-ups of the over-contracted
are positive during most of the sample, contradicting the predictions of the models that
assume individual profit maximizing behavior among contracted firms (Newbery (1998),
Wolak (2000), and Section 4 of this paper).
Accordingly, our aim is to assess whether the periods of intense rivalry and the pat-
tern of firms’ mark-ups are consistent with some kind of dynamic interaction. Based on
a discussion of the features of the Spanish electricity market, we argue that the potential
dynamic interaction is best captured by models of imperfect monitoring, such as the ones
pioneered by Green and Porter (1984). Nevertheless, the fact that firms are contracted
implies that the underlying game needs to be modified with respect to Green and Porter’s.
In this paper, we characterize such a game in order to identify the trigger variables that
firms could be using to support a collusive equilibrium, and to obtain predictions concern-
ing the effects of those triggers on the probability of starting a price war. The analysis
shows that an increase (rather than a decrease) in the market price could be interpreted
as a good signal of cheating. Among the other trigger variables considered are the changes
in firms’ market shares and revenues.
Based on the theoretical predictions, we model the pattern of pool prices by means
of an autoregressive Markov switching model in the mean with time varying transition
probabilities. This process allows for distinct price-cycle phases, with the switching prob-
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abilities depending on the trigger variables identified within the theoretical framework.
The statistical model thus enables us to test whether the pattern of prices is character-
ized by different price levels, whether the effects of the trigger variables are statistically
significant, and whether the signs of these effects coincide with those predicted by the
theory.
Our results support the hypothesis that two distinct price levels characterize the time
series of prices in the Spanish electricity market during 1998. Furthermore, most of the
triggers considered appear significant and they report the predicted signs. In particular,
the probability of starting a price war increases when the market share and revenues of
the over-contracted (under-contracted) firm increases (decreases) and the market price
increases above its usually prevailing level. This shows that firms’ pricing behavior has
been highly influenced by the recovery of stranded costs and the way in which these have
been reimbursed. In summary, our results suggest that the Spanish electricity producers
might have been alternating between episodes of collusion and price wars, giving strong
support to Green and Porter’s theory.3
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we provide an overview of
the Spanish electricity industry. In Section 3 we motivate the analysis of the paper in
the light of the pattern of demand, prices, and marginal costs in the Spanish electricity
market during 1998. In Section 4 we set out a framework for the empirical analysis, which
is presented in Section 5. Section 6 of the paper concludes.
2 The Spanish Electricity Industry
In 1997, the Spanish electricity industry experienced fundamental changes.4 It evolved
from a system in which the allocation of output among the electricity producers was based
on yardstick competition to one that relied on market forces as a way of finding the most
economic use of the available resources. Under the current regulatory design, transactions
are organized through a series of sequential markets -the daily market and the intradaily
markets- and technical processes governed by the System Operator.
3Porter (1983), Porter (1985) and Ellison (1994) investigate the stability of the 19th century US railroad
cartel. In both studies, the triggers considered reported opposite signs to those predicted by the theory,
or they did not appear to be significant.
4The reforms were implemented through the Electricity Law 54/1997 of 27 November 1997. See Arocena,
Kuhn and Regibeau (1999) and Fabra Utray (2004) for an overview and discussion.
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The daily market concentrates most of the transactions.5 All available production
units, excluding those already committed to a physical contract, are obliged to participate
in it as suppliers. They are asked to submit, each day on a day-ahead basis, the minimum
prices at which they are willing to make their generation available in each of the 24 hourly
markets.6 The demand side is made of the distributors and qualified consumers, who
are also required to submit the maximum prices at which they are willing to consume
electricity, in a similar fashion as suppliers. On the basis of these supply and purchase
bids, the Market Operator constructs the industry supply and demand curves, ranking
the production and demand units in increasing and decreasing merit order, respectively.
The intersection between the industry supply and demand curves determines the market
clearing price (the so-called System Marginal Price or SMP), which will be received (paid)
by all suppliers (demanders) which offered to produce (consume) at lower or equal (greater
or equal) prices. The System Operator has the responsibility of studying and solving
the technical constraints that may have derived from the daily market. Closer to real
time, the intradaily market sessions allow market participants to fine-tune their positions
previously undertaken in the daily market. The physical balance in the network between
the production and the consumption of electricity is ensured at all times by the System
Operator through the ancillary services markets.
The basic structure of the Spanish electricity industry was transformed during the
1990s as a result of a consolidation process among the numerous regional electricity com-
panies.7 The result was a highly concentrated industry, both horizontally and vertically.8
The two largest participants - Endesa and Iberdrola - control almost 80% of total avail-
5In 1998, the daily market concentrated 99% of all the electricity traded in the wholesale markets.
6The sale and purchase bids can be made by considering from 1 to 25 energy blocks in each hour, with the
proposed price. The bid schedules have to be increasing (decreasing) in the quantity offered (demanded).
The supply bids can be simple, or they can include additional conditions, such as indivisibility, load
gradient, minimum income and scheduled shutdown.
7Part of this consolidation process was government-led. One remarkable instance of this was the govern-
ment’s decision to strengthen Endesa prior to its privatization in 1996, by allowing it to acquire FECSA and
Sevillana, which controlled the 10% and the 9% of total capacity, respectively (see Mar´ın and Garc´ıa-Dı´az
(2003)).
8Distribution remains a regulated activity. In 1998, large customers (with annual consumption exceeding
15 GWh) were qualified to contract with a competitive retailer or to participate directly into the market.
The volume of electricity acquired by qualified consumers represented a very small fraction of the total
market volume (1,000 GWh versus 154,000 GWh over 1998).
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Firm/ Technology Hydro Coal Fuel-Gas Nuclear Total MW Shares
Endesa 6,134 6,684 3,869 3,185 19,872 45.6
Iberdrola 8,175 1,141 3,258 3,533 16,407 37.7
Unio´n Fenosa 1,733 1,972 784 765 5,254 12.1
Hidrocanta´brico 410 1,127 0 149 1,686 3.9
Total MW 16,452 11,224 8,231 7.632 43,539 100.0
Capacity Shares 37.8 25.8 18.9 17.5 100.0
Table 1: Installed Capacity by Firm and Technology (MW), 1998 (Source: CNE (2000)).
able generating capacity, and the remaining 20% is divided among two smaller firms -
Unio´n Fenosa and Hidrocanta´brico - and several fringe companies. Technology mixes vary
widely across firms: whereas Endesa owns more than half of total thermal capacity, Iber-
drola controls around a half of total hydro power. Table 1 summarizes the capacity shares
by company and technology type in the Spanish electricity market.
Generators have three main sources of revenues: market revenues, capacity payments,
and stranded cost recovery payments. Firstly, as already described, a generator may earn
revenues through the daily, intradaily and ancillary services markets; in these markets,
each generator’s revenue is given by the market clearing price in the relevant demand
period, times its quantity despatched. Secondly, all the production units that participate
in the daily market receive a capacity payment per unit of capacity declared available.
Given that firms earn capacity payments independently of their pricing decisions, these
payments should have had no impact on the pattern of prices. We will therefore omit
them from our analysis.9
Last, the incumbent generators are entitled to earn the so-called Competition Transi-
tion Charges (CTC) during a ten-year period. These charges are in place to compensate
firms for the value of their stranded investments. The maximum amount of these pay-
ments was computed as the difference between the net present value of the revenues that
firms were entitled to receive under the former regulatory regime and firms’ market ex-
pected revenues, under the assumption that the competitive market price would be 3.6
Cente /kWh on average. The amount of CTCs to be paid to the whole industry in a par-
9As a robustness check, the empirical analysis was also carried out including the capacity payment (i.e.
using the final price rather than the spot market price). The results were essentially unchanged.
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ticular year is computed as the residual amount obtained from extracting the regulated
costs (mainly, payments to distributor-which are reimbursed their costs of buying electric-
ity in the spot market plus a rate of return-, payments to transmission and subsidies to
national coal) from the total regulated revenues earned through the final tariff. The Law
established that this residual amount would be shared among firms on the basis of some
predetermined shares: 51.2% for Endesa, 27.1% for Iberdrola, 12.9% for Unio´n Fenosa and
5.7% for Hidrocanta´brico.
Two conditions were imposed on the value of the CTCs to be received by a firm over the
transition period. First, if the average price received by a firm exceeded 3.6 Cente /kWh,
the extra revenues should be deducted from the firm’s maximum CTC entitlement. And
second, a firm’s CTC revenues could not exceed the maximum entitlement established by
Law. These two conditions imposed a price-cap and a price-floor on the pool price. On
the one hand, it would not be profitable for any firm to raise prices over 3.6 Cente /kWh,
as any increase in market revenues would be offset by the reduction in the firm’s total
CTC entitlement.10 On the other hand, it would not be profitable to reduce prices to a
level below the one that allowed a firm to obtain its maximum entitlement, given that the
reduced market revenues would not be compensated by an increase in its CTC revenues.11
3 Motivation for the Analysis
In order to analyze firms’ strategic behavior in the Spanish electricity market during
1998, we perform an empirical analysis using detailed information on demand, prices and
other variables that allow for an accurate estimation of firms’ marginal costs (Section
5.1 describes the data and the estimation technique). In this section, we present some
preliminary evidence to motivate the type of analysis that we pursue in the remainder of
the paper.
10This assertion is valid as long as firms do not discount the future stream of profits very strongly, and
as long as they perceive full regulatory certainty about the payment of their total CTC entitlements. This
second concern started to play a role from 1999 onwards, when the European Commission opened up an
investigation to determine whether the CTCs were State Aids, in which case they would have been banned.
11The maximum amount of CTCs was fixed at e 11,951.5m, 1,774.6 of which were subsidies to national
coal, and the rest was the maximum amount to be divided among the incumbent firms. In 1998, firms
perceived CTCs which amounted to e 633.5m. The maximum entitlements of Endesa and Iberdrola were
reduced by e 67.5m and e 47.15m respectively, because their average prices exceeded 3.6 Cente /kWh.
See CNE (2000) and Nacional del Sistema Ele´ctrico (1998) for more detailed descriptions.
Price Wars and Collusion in the Spanish Electricity Market 7
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350
400000
500000
Demand (MWh) 
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350
1.50
1.75
2.00
2.25
Industry Marginal Cost (cents Euro/kWh) 
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350
1
2
3
System Marginal Price (cents Euro/kWh) 
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350
−0.5
0.0
0.5
Industry Price−Cost Mark−up 
Figure 1: Total Demand, Marginal Costs, SMP and Price-cost Mark-ups in the Spanish
Electricity Market, 1998
Figure 1 plots the time series of demand, prices and the estimated marginal costs and
price-cost mark-ups in the Spanish electricity market from January 1998 to December 1998.
Demand follows a strongly seasonal pattern that is mainly driven by weather conditions
and labor patterns. The time series of costs also depicts a seasonal pattern, which can
be attributed to demand movements, changes in the availability of hydro resources, and
scheduled maintenance plans. Prices show a systematic relationship with the evolution
of demand and cost conditions during most of the time. However, there are five to seven
episodes in which prices fall below their usually prevailing levels. These price jumps seem
to be uncorrelated with cost movements, as can be inferred from the series of price-cost
mark-ups.
This pattern of prices is not consistent with the static models of price competition in
electricity markets (see Green and Newbery (1992) and von der Fehr and Harbord (1993)),
as they predict a positive relationship between demand conditions and prices, once the
differences in cost conditions have been accounted for.12 The outburst of these periods
12In Section 4 we provide a further explanation for why market outcomes are not consistent with models
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of intense rivalry thus seems to suggest that firms have followed more complex dynamic
strategies than the simple repetition of the static one-shot equilibria.
The regime-switching models of the type pioneered by Green and Porter (1984) provide
a possible explanation for this pattern of prices (see also Abreu, Pierce and Stacchetti
(1986)). In these models, firms move between cooperative and punishment periods (price
wars) as a way to enforce collusive outcomes. Under imperfect monitoring (i.e. imperfect
information about firms’ past actions or market conditions), firms are unable to distinguish
whether changes in the observable variables are due to changes in market conditions or to
cheating by one of the cartel members. Thus, in order to discourage deviations, reversions
to some short-run unprofitable behavior must be employed when one of the observable
variables behaves as if a deviation had occurred.
There are two main reasons why the Spanish electricity market differs from the classic
Green and Porter’s (1984) formulation: one concerns the source of imperfect information;
the other is related to the differences in the underlying game, which have implications
for identifying the optimal deviations and thus for the pattern of switches that would be
consistent with the theory (see Section 4).
The information available to the Spanish electricity producers is richer than the one
assumed in a Green and Porter type of model. In particular, the aggregate information on
the prices and quantities demanded is made public at gate-closure. Nevertheless, even
if the total quantity demanded is known with certainty, the total quantity traded in
the market is uncertain, as it results from extracting total demand minus the volume
negotiated through bilateral contracts (typically, exports and imports),13 and the amount
produced by must-take resources (mainly, co-generation and renewables). Furthermore,
firms’ available capacities are unobservable, as these are subject to random and publicly
unknown shocks, which are out of firms’ control (e.g. capacities may suffer random outages,
or be increased due to an excess of run of river hydro power). This implies that a firm’s
departure from any agreed upon market share may result either from cheating by a rival
firm, or from any of the random and unobservable factors mentioned above. In other
of individual profit maximization.
13Exports and imports result from long-term bilateral contracts signed between the Spanish and French,
Portuguese and Moroccan System Operators. The interconnection between France and Spain is very
limited: only approximately 800 MW of transmission capacity are available (excluding the ones committed
for reliability purposes), 550 MW of which are almost permanently used by the contract EDF-REE. See
CNE (2000) for a description of these contracts.
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words, the Spanish electricity producers are faced with the same kind of signal extraction
problem as in a Green and Porter type of model.
There is an alternative branch of the literature on collusion in markets subject to vari-
able demand, exemplified by the models of Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) and Haltiwanger
and Harrington (1991). In these models, which assume perfect monitoring, price wars do
not arise as equilibrium phenomena. Instead, the sustainability of collusion is maintained
through smoother price adjustments, which depend on current or future demand condi-
tions. We believe that the Green and Porter’s theory is better suited to explain dynamic
behavior in the Spanish electricity industry, for several reasons. First, as explained above,
perfect monitoring is an unrealistic assumption in this market. Second, in Rotemberg and
Saloner (1986), future demand movements are unpredictable, whereas electricity demand
is driven by a strong seasonal pattern. Third, the existence of tight capacity constraints
might have an impact on both punishment and deviation profits that may reverse the
predictions made by Haltiwanger and Harrington (1991) concerning the sustainability of
collusion over the demand cycle (see Fabra (2003a)). Last, price movements in the Spanish
market over 1998 resemble more the price wars phenomena described in Green and Porter
rather than the smooth and cyclical price adjustments in Rotemberg and Saloner (1986)
and Haltiwanger and Harrington (1991).
In the next sections, we assess whether the behavior of pool prices in the Spanish
electricity market is consistent with Green and Porter’s theory. For this purpose, we first
construct a simple theoretical model to characterize firms’ expected profit maximizing
bidding behavior in the wholesale electricity market, accounting for some its institutional
details. This model also allows to uncover some of the possible variables (referred to as
trigger variables) that firms could be using to support collusive strategies of the Green
and Porter type. The empirical analysis in Section 5 is based on the predictions of this
model.
4 The Theoretical Framework
Consider an industry made of n ≥ 2 firms who compete to supply electricity in every period
t. Market demand, denoted Q (εt) , is assumed to be perfectly inelastic14 and it is subject
14This is reasonable given that in the Spanish electricity consumers pay fixed tariffs which are indepen-
dent of pool price movements. Eligible consumers are allowed to bid downward sloping demand functions,
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to demand shocks εt. We assume that firm i, i = 1, ...n, has a variable cost function (i.e.
net of fixed costs) of the form Cit = Cit (qit) , where qit represents the quantity supplied by
firm i. The derivative of the cost function with respect to output gives firm i’s marginal
costs, which are denoted MCi.
Competition takes place by firms submitting supply functions to an auctioneer.15 Firm
i’s supply function in period t, denoted Sit (p) , is an upward sloping function which gives
the maximum quantity that it is willing to produce in period t in exchange of a price
p. Given the demand shock realization εt, the residual demand facing firm i when its
rivals have supply schedules Sjt (p) , j 6= i, is Qt (εt) −
∑
j 6=i Sjt (p) , and it is denoted
DRit (p, εt) . Once firms have submitted their supply functions, the auctioneer selects the
minimum price such that the market clears and each firm is producing on its supply
function. All scheduled production is paid at the market clearing price.
In the Spanish electricity market, firms have an additional source of revenues, namely,
the revenues accrued from the Competition Transition Charges (CTCs). We model these
payments as the difference between the (fixed) retail price τ and the market clearing
price, p, times the total quantity demanded, [τ − p]Qt. This amount is shared among
generators on the basis of some predetermined shares, αi, i = 1, ..., n, with
∑n
i=1 αi = 1.
Note that CTCs play essentially the same role as ‘Contracts for Differences’: the firm
supplies all its output in exchange of the market price, and receives the difference between
the ‘contract price’, τ, and the market price, p, for the ‘quantity contracted’, αiQt. From
a methodological perspective, the analysis of CTCs is simpler as the ‘contract price’ and
the ‘quantity contracted’ are known and predetermined, i.e. they are not endogenous to
what happens in the market.
Using the above notation, we can express firm i’s variable profits in period t as a
function of the residual demand faced by firm i, given the demand shock realization, εt,
as follows:
piit (p, εt) = pDRit(p, εt) + [τ − p]Qt (εt)αi − Ci (DRit(p, εt)) . (1)
Taking the first derivative of (1) with respect to p gives the market clearing price
that maximizes firm i’s profits given the supply functions submitted by its rivals and the
but in 1998 these represented a very small share of total demand (less than 1% in December 1998). Pumping
storage also represents a small fraction of total demand.
15See Klemperer and Meyer (1989), whose analysis of supply function equilibria has been applied to
electricity markets by Green and Newbery (1992) and Wolak (2000), among others.
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demand shock realization εt embodied in the residual demand curve DRit(p, εt). Substi-
tuting firm i’s profit maximizing price into its residual demand yields its profit maximizing
quantity. Accordingly, firm i’s profit maximizing supply curve is the upward-sloping func-
tion passing through all the profit maximizing price and quantity pairs for all the possible
residual demand realizations that the firm might face.
The previous analysis implies that, independently of the residual demand realization,
the following first-order condition must be satisfied in equilibrium:
pt =MCit +
pt
γit
mit − αi
mit
, (2)
where pt is the market price in period t, MCit is firm i’s marginal cost of producing the
quantity DRit(pt), µit is the elasticity of the residual demand curve faced by firm i in
period t evaluated at pt, γit = −DR′it(pt) ptDRit(pt) , and mit is firm i’s market share in
period t, mit =
DRit(pt)
Qt
.16
Re-writing equation (2) in terms of the mark-up,
pt −MCit
pt
=
1
γit
mit − αi
mit
, (3)
shows that the profit-maximizing solution is a modified version of the standard monopoly
inverse-elasticity rule. Given that we are considering the oligopoly case, the relevant
elasticity is that of the residual demand faced by a firm, which takes into account the
bidding behavior of its competitors. Furthermore, the profit-maximizing solution results
from balancing the opposite effects that prices have on market revenues and CTC revenues.
An increase in the market price increases the firm’s market revenues proportionally to its
market share, but reduces its CTC revenues proportionally to its CTC share. Therefore,
whether the impact of a price increase on the firm’s overall profits is positive or negative
depends on whether the firm’s market share is larger or smaller than its CTC share.
As a result, whenever a firm’s market share is greater (lower) than its CTC share, its
profit-maximizing price is above (below) its marginal costs.
The above analysis has an important implication for our empirical investigation: if
firms were bidding according to their individual profit maximizing strategies, we should
observe negative (positive) mark-ups for the firms with a CTC share above (below) their
market shares. Figure 2, which plots the relationship between Endesa’s and Iberdrola’s
16There are many solutions to equation (2), and therefore many supply function equilibria. Nevertheless,
what is relevant for our current purposes is that equation (2) must hold in any pure strategy equilibrium.
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Figure 2: Endesa’s and Iberdrola’s Market Shares, CTC Shares and Mark-ups, 1998
market shares and CTC shares together with their mark-ups, shows that this is not the
case. In particular, Endesa’s market share always lies below its CTC share and its mark-
ups are positive for most of the sample period.17 This observation leads us to conjecture
that firms may have been engaged in some tacit agreement that distorts the market price
and firms’ market shares from the ones that would result from individual profit maximiza-
tion.
To explore this conjecture empirically, we derive firms’ supply curves from the following
joint profit maximization problem. Suppose that two firms, i = 1, 2, agree to bid in a way
that maximizes a weighted sum of their profits. For a given demand shock realization,
their objective is to choose the price that maximizes
θ1pi1t (p, εt) + θ2pi2t (p, εt) , (4)
where θi ∈ [0, 1] , with θ1 + θ2 = 1, is the weight given to firm i’s profits, piit (p, εt) , as
given in (1), i = 1, 2. Following the same steps as above, firms’ joint profit maximizing
17Although our marginal cost estimates could be mis-measured, the potential error should be extremely
large so as to reverse the sign of Endesa’s mark-ups. See Section 5.1.
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supply curves can be found by joining all the joint profit maximizing price and quantity
pairs for all the possible residual demand realizations.
Regardless of the demand shock realization εt, the following condition must be satisfied
under the joint-profit maximizing solution,
pt = Θ1t
[
MC1t +
pt
γ1t
m1t − α1
m1t
]
+Θ2t
[
MC2t +
pt
γ2t
m2t − α2
m2t
]
, (5)
where
Θit = θiDR′it (pt)
[
θ1DR
′
1t (pt) + θ2DR
′
2t (pt)
]−1
> 0, i = 1, 2.
The joint-profit maximizing price (5) is a weighted average of the individual profit
maximizing prices for each firm, as expressed in (2). Given that firms are not producing
on their profit-maximizing supply functions, each one may have a unilateral incentive to
deviate.
In what follows, we will assume that the trigger strategies used to discourage individual
deviations take the same form as in Green and Porter (1984): firms bid according to the
collusive scheme as long as they do not observe large discrepancies with respect to the
collusive outcomes; otherwise, firms are called to bid aggressively during a finite number
of periods, and to revert to cooperative behavior until no such discrepancies are observed
again.
For this trigger strategy to be incentive compatible, actual cheating must increase the
likelihood of such discrepancies being large, so that deviations increase the likelihood of
entering into a punishment phase. Likewise, price wars should be triggered when changes
in the observable variables upon which firms infer their rivals’ behavior are compatible
with a deviation having taken place. Hence, in order to identify the trigger variables that
could be used to support this equilibrium, one should ask which among the observable
variables would be a good signal of cheating. This purports to characterizing firms’ optimal
deviations from the joint-profit maximizing solution.
For this purpose, index firms such that best response bidding by firm 1 results in a
lower price than best response bidding by firm 2. From equation (2),
MC1t +
pt
γ1t
m1t − α1
m1t
< MC2t +
pt
γ2t
m2t − α2
m2t
.
This implies that, under the joint-profit maximizing solution, the market price (5) is
above (below) the price that would result from best response bidding by firm 1 (firm 2).
Accordingly, firm 1 would have one-shot incentives to deviate by bidding more aggressively,
Price Wars and Collusion in the Spanish Electricity Market 14
whereas firm 2 would have one-shot incentives to bid less aggressively. Firms’ optimal
deviations would result in an increase (reductions) in firm 1’s (2’s) market share. Also,
the optimal deviation by firm 1 would lead to a reduction in firm 2’s market revenues
(since its market share and price would be lower), whereas the optimal deviation by firm
2 would lead to an increase in firm 1’s market revenues (since its market share and price
would be higher). Hence, changes in firms’ market shares and revenues in these directions
could signal deviations.
Again, we can apply this reasoning to our data set. Given that Endesa’s market share
always lies below its CTC share and given that its mark-up is positive, it must be the
case that the market price is larger than the one that would result from best response
bidding by Endesa. Therefore, we can reinterpret the previous paragraphs by reading
Endesa where it says firm 1, and Iberdrola where it says firm 2. This allows us to draw
the following empirical prediction. For the Green and Porter’s model to be consistent
with bidding behavior in the Spanish electricity market, it must be the case that increases
in Endesa’s market share and revenues, and reductions in Iberdrola’s market share and
revenues, increase the probability of starting a price war.
5 The Empirical Analysis
5.1 Data Description
For the empirical analysis, we will be using detailed daily data on price, quantities and
other variables, some of which are expressed at the industry level, at the firm level, or at
the plant level. The sample covers the period from January 1998 through December 1998.
Table 2 provides summary statistics of all the variables we will use in our analysis.
Among our variables, we will use the daily aggregate industry production and the
daily quantities produced by Endesa and Iberdrola, which we will denote by Qt, QENDt
and QIBt respectively. All the quantity variables are measured in MWh. Our price variable
is denoted SMPt, which represents the demand-weighted average price in the daily market;
it is measured in Cente /kWh.
In addition, we have constructed estimates of marginal costs and mark-ups (Boren-
stein et al. (2002), Joskow and Kahn (2002) and Wolfram (1999) use similar estimation
techniques). For this purpose, we have first derived the shot-run thermal cost curve at the
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firm level by estimating the marginal production costs for each generating plant, on a daily
basis.18 The short-run marginal costs of a thermal plant (including nuclear, coal, oil and
natural gas plants) depend on the type of fuel it burns, the cost of the fuel, the plant’s
heat rate (i.e. the efficiency rate at which each plant converts the heat content of the
fuel into output), and the short-run variable cost of operating and maintaining the plant
(O&M).19 We have assumed that the costs of the fossil-fuels are those negotiated daily in
the international input markets.20 In addition, to calculate the cost of the coal plants, we
have added an estimate of transportation costs based on the distance between each plant
and the nearest harbor where coal is delivered. Lastly, we have assumed that the available
capacity of each plant equals its average availability over a given month in those days in
which the plant was not subject to scheduled maintenance or forced outages; a plant’s
available capacity is assumed to be zero otherwise.21 By aggregating the capacities of a
firm’s thermal plants in increasing cost order, we obtain an estimate of its thermal cost
curve in a given day (see Figure 3).
To obtain hourly marginal cost estimates, we need to intersect each firm’s thermal
cost curve with its thermal production in every hour, i.e. its total production net of its
hydro production. For this purpose, we need to assume how firms allocate total hydro
production during the day, given that we lack information on the hourly hydro production
18There are intertemporal and operational constraints that affect firms’ costs (e.g. start-up costs or
ramping rates). Our cost estimation does not take these into account (see Borenstein et al. (2002) for a
discussion of how this could affect the estimates).
19The information on the types of fuel burned by each plant, together with their heat rates and operating
and maintenance costs, has been obtained from Red Ele´ctrica de Espan˜a (REE is the Spanish Transmission
Owner and System Operator).
20We have not considered firms’ obligation to burn domestic coal, and the subsidies obtained from so
doing. For coal units, we use the MCIS Index, for fuel units we use the F.O.1% CIF NWE prices, and
for gas units we use the Gazexport-Ruhrgas prices. All series are in Cente /te. We have obtained this
information from UNESA (the Spanish National Union of Electricity companies). For nuclear plants, we
have assumed a fixed input cost equal to 0.5 Cente /te; this does not affect the results as nuclear plants
are never marginal.
21In a study of the British electricity market, Wolfram (1999) assigns each plant a capacity below its
declared capacity to capture the strategic withholding aimed at increasing capacity payments (Patrick and
Wolak (1997)). In the Spanish electricity market, capacity payments are fixed per kW declared available,
implying that firms do not have incentives to under-declare their available capacities. Nevertheless, it must
be noted that the scheduling of planned outages for maintenance may be subject to strategic considerations
(e.g. it may be profitable to shift scheduled outages from off-peak to on-peak periods, see Patrick and
Wolak (1997) for evidence on this).
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Figure 3: Representative Thermal Cost Curves at the Firm Level (on 27/12/98).
figures. Our data set distinguishes between each firm’s daily pondage hydro and run of
the river. Whereas firms can choose when to allocate the former, they cannot choose when
to produce with the latter. Hence, we have allocated run of the river production evenly
over the day. For pondage hydro, we have assumed that firms use it non-strategically
and allocate it to high demand hours. This results in firms equalizing thermal production
across the hours in which they allocate pondage hydro power, i.e. firms peak-shave each
hour. Bushnell (2003) finds that strategic firms may have an incentive to increase hydro
production in off-peak hours, rather than on-peak hours, thereby distorting the efficient
use of hydro resources. Our methodology does not fully exclude this kind of strategic
behavior given that we only assume non-strategic hydro allocation over the course of a
day, i.e. firms could still be strategically allocating hydro over the year. Accordingly, we
do not expect that the assumed peak-shaving procedure would considerably bias our cost
estimates (or at least to the extent that the qualitative nature of the results would be
reversed).
Since we will be using daily figures, we have used our hourly marginal cost estimates to
compute a demand-weighted average. In the empirical analysis, we will be using marginal
cost estimates for Endesa and Iberdrola only; these are denoted MCENDt and MC
IB
t .
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We have also computed firms’ price-cost mark-ups, which are denoted MarkupENDt and
MarkupIBt for Endesa and Iberdrola (see Figure 2).
We have constructed additional variables aimed at capturing firms’ strategic behavior.
The choice of these variables is based on the theoretical discussion presented in Section
4. The variables ∆ShareENDt−1 and ∆ShareIBt−1 are intended to capture a plausible trigger
in an industry geared by a collusive agreement that switches to a price war when a firm’s
market share suffers a suspiciously large change (either positive or negative). They are
measured as percentage changes in the firm’s market share with respect to the previous
period’s value (lagged one period). The trigger variable ∆HHIt−1, which represents the
one period lagged value of changes in the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (i.e. the sum of
the squared market shares of all firms in the industry), captures the changes in all firms’
market shares. The variables ∆RevENDt−1 and ∆RevIBt−1 are intended to capture a similar
trigger, based on changes in firms’ market revenues. Last, we consider the lagged changes
in the weekly average price, ∆SMP t−1.
The changes in firms’ market shares and revenues shares depict a strong weekly seasonal
component that would enter into the definitions of the trigger variables. In order to only
consider their unexpected changes, the associated trigger variables have been constructed
on deseasonalized values of production levels and revenues.22
5.2 The Empirical Model
As our statistical model we will consider an autoregressive Markov switching model in the
mean with time varying transition probabilities (TVTP). The TVTP model encompasses
the fix transition probability model (FTP), as it may allow the switching probabilities to
either change or not change over time. Furthermore, in contrast to the FTP in which the
expected duration of a phase of low/high prices is constant, the TVTP is linked to the
notion of time-varying duration in the Markov switching framework.
The autoregressive TVTP Markov-switching model of prices allows for distinct price-
cycle phases (collusive price phase/ price war phase) with state dependent means, and
22The deseasonalization is implemented using an unobserved component model. This model is estimated
in the series of production and revenues of each of the generators and the Kalman filter is used to extract
the different components. A local trend model with trigonometric seasonal and an irregular component is
chosen as the benchmark specification. The estimated models are available from the authors upon request.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics
Mean Variance Min Max
Qt 423,350 47,462 305,950 524,500
QENDt 195,910 26,412 119,170 257,600
QIBt 131,060 197,69 894,800 190,880
SMPt 2.5525 0.3891 0.97613 3.1791
MCENDt 2.5124 0.3914 1.2500 3.2830
MCIBt 2.4592 0.3577 1.3270 3.1098
MarkupENDt -0.01310 0.2415 -1.0229 0.5645
MarkupIBt 0.00176 0.2671 -1.8256 0.5494
∆ShareENDt−1 0.0005 0.0210 -0.09159 0.0992
∆ShareIBt−1 -0.0008 0.0300 -0.11032 0.1344
∆RevENDt−1 -0.0016 0.1643 -1.0392 0.9913
∆RevIB
t−1 -0.0027 0.1426 -0.73729 0.7650
∆SMP t−1 -0.0021 0.1712 -0.53367 1.0237
∆HHIt−1 0.0002 0.0124 -0.03820 0.0410
DistributionIBt 170,840 222,97 115,040 230,330
Availabilityt 16,812 527.6 15,805 17,772
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for dynamics of prices with the lagged predetermined variables.23 The state of prices is
not known with certainty. The econometrician can neither observe the state of prices nor
deduce the state directly. These states are assumed to be path dependent and evolve
according to a first-order Markov process with TVTP coefficients. The TVTP model with
state dependent mean can be presented as:24
SMPt = µSt + βZt + υ
s
t (6)
µSt = µ0(1− St) + µ1St
St = 0, 1.
where SMPt is the system marginal price in period t, µSt is the mean of prices in state St,
which can either be a collusive state, St = 0, or a price war state, St = 1 (i.e. µ0 ≥ µ1),
and Zt is a group of variables that are likely to influence prices.
The stochastic process on St can be summarized by the following transition probability:
P (St = st|St−1 = st−1, wt−1),
where st is a possible realization of the random variable St. We assume serial correlation
of the states (e.g. a collusive period is likely to be followed by another collusive period).
The variable wt−1 is likely to influence the transition probabilities, and it is henceforth
referred to as ‘trigger variable’.25,26
23In this respect, we depart from Ellison (1994) since he allows for autoregressive residuals, which in our
view could be a sign of misspecification because of the omission of lagged dependent variables.
24Equation (6) could include the trigger-variables (wt−1). However, we formulate our model with the
trigger-variables influencing only the transition probabilities, to emphasize the contribution of the TVTP
on the price dynamics.
25Two issues need to be stressed. First, we have explicitly written lagged wt−1, because the theory
predicts that firms should react immediately after they observe an anomalous behavior of the trigger
variables. And second, in Green and Porter’s model, firms stay in a price war for a given number of
periods (conditionally on no deviations having taken place along the punishment path). Hence, it would
be reasonable to make the transition probability p(wt−1) dependent on the number of periods firms have
been in a price war, i.e. on duration, dt−1. We are aware that omitting the dependence of p(wt−1) on dt−1
might lead to inconsistent estimates of the response of wt−1 on p. This should not affect our main results
however. We are only interested in determining the probability of entering into a price war, 1 − q(wt−1),
which should not be dependent on duration.
26In order to obtain consistent and normally distributed estimates from our maximum likelihood esti-
mators presented, the trigger-variables chosen should be conditionally uncorrelated with the states, given
the current prices (see Engle, Hendry and Richard (1983) and Filardo (1994)). This would allow us to
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The matrix of transition probabilities is given by:
Λt−1 =
 q(wt−1) 1− p(wt−1)
1− q(wt−1) p(wt−1)
 , (7)
where q(wt−1) = P (St = 0|St−1 = 0, wt−1) and p(wt−1) = P (St = 0|St−1 = 1, wt−1).
This specification only considers two different states, but it could be extended to allow
for further regimes.27 One difficulty at the time of dealing with this type of models is that
conventional testing approaches to deal with the number of regimes are not applicable
due to the presence of unidentified nuisance parameters under the null of linearity (that
is, the transition probabilities) and because the scores associated with the parameters of
interest under the alternative hypothesis may be identically zero under the null. Formal
tests of the number of regimes within the Markov-switching framework employing the
standardized likelihood ratio (LR) test designed to deliver (asymptotically) valid inference
have been proposed by Davies (1977), Hansen (1992), Hansen (1996) and Garcia (1993).
The possibility of three regimes is further analyzed in the following subsection.
In searching for a particular functional form of the transition probabilities, we will use
the logistic function:28
P (St = k|St−1 = l, wt−1) = exp(λlk,0 + λlk,1wt−1)1 + exp(λlk,0 + λlk,1wt−1) , k, l = 0, 1.
We are interested in characterizing the probability of starting a price war. This is given
by
1− q(wt−1) = P (St = 1|St−1 = 0, wt−1) = 1− exp(λ00,0 + λ00,1wt−1)1 + exp(λ00,0 + λ00,1wt−1) . (8)
Thus the parameter estimate λ00,1 reflects the influence of wt−1 on 1− q(wt−1).29
estimate consistently our TVTP model using jointly the conditional maximum likelihood estimator (MLE)
and the filtering methods proposed in Hamilton (1989). This is the case of our trigger variables.
27We are grateful to the referees for pointing this out.
28As in binary response models different specifications are available for mapping the index function
(λlk,0 + λlk,1wt−1, k, l = 0, 1) into a probability. We could have tried other alternatives for our trans-
formation function, F (·), such as a normal or a Cauchy cumulative distribution function instead of the
logistic specification chosen. However, we have preferred the latter specification because of tractability
reasons. For the normal and Cauchy cumulative distribution functions there is no close form expression
for F (x), which has to be evaluated numerically. This would have increased the amount of calculations in
the type of models we use, which are already very computer intensive.
29Note that the sign of marginal effect of wt−1 on the probability of starting a price war will have the
opposite sign as the λ00,1s.
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With autoregressive dynamics of order 1 the conditional joint density distribution, f,
is given by:
f(SMPt|SMPt−1, wt−1,Zt) =
1∑
st=0
1∑
st−1=0
f(SMPt, St = st, St−1 = st−1|SMPt−1, wt−1,Zt)
=
1∑
st=0
1∑
st−1=0
f(SMPt|St = st, St−1 = st−1, SMPt−1, wt−1,Zt)
P (St = st, St−1 = st−1|SMPt−1, wt−1,Zt)
=
1∑
st=0
1∑
st−1=0
f(SMPt|St = st, St−1 = st−1, SMPt−1, wt−1,Zt)
P (St = st|St−1 = st−1, wt−1)P (St−1 = st−1|wt−1)
and the likelihood function is:
L(θ) =
T∑
t=1
ln f(SMPt|SMPt−1, Zt, wt−1; θ),
where θ are the parameters of interest. The states are unobserved by the econometrician
and the filter developed in Hamilton (1989) is used to jointly estimate the parameters of
the model and the process governing the states.
In order to analyze the pattern of prices in the Spanish electricity market, we will
estimate a version of the joint-profit maximizing first order condition (5). Rearranging
terms we get,
SMPt = β1MCENDt + β2MC
IB
t + β3Q
END
t + β4Q
IB
t + β5Q
R
t (9)
where QRt =
[
Qt −QENDt −QIBt
]
is the residual demand not served by the strategic firms
(i.e. covered through imports, the production of the non-strategic firms, etc). From the
analysis of Section 4, it can be checked that the expected signs of the coefficients should
be positive for β1 and β2, negative for β5, and either positive or negative for β3 and β4.
In order to formulate Equation (9) as in (6), we express the variables in deviations
from their means and allow the mean of prices to fluctuate between two states. Last,
we introduce autoregressive dynamics to allow for cross-price effects. This results in our
equation of interest,
SMPt − µSt = ρ(SMPt−1 − µSt−1) + βZt + υst (10)
where β is the vector of parameters in the linear part of the model, Zt = [MCENDt −
E(MCENDt ), MC
IB
t − E(MCIBt ), QENDt − E(QENDt ), QIBt − E(QIBt ), QRt − E(QRt )]′ is
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the corresponding vector of variables measured in deviations from their means, the term
υst ∼ N(0, σs) captures innovations or shocks unmodelled in our supply equation and µSt
denotes the time varying mean of prices, where St denotes the state, with St = 0 if t is a
collusive period (high prices), and St = 1 if t belongs to a price war (low prices).
Note that there could be three potential sources of endogeneity of the Zt variables: the
demand not served by the strategic firms, QRt , and the quantities they produce, Q
END
t
and QIBt , are likely to be correlated with innovations in our price equation, (10). In order
to address this endogeneity problem we respectively instrument these variables with week-
end dummies, the available thermal capacity in the industry, and the demand distributed
by Iberdrola (see Table 2 for summary statistics of these variables). These are all valid
instruments as they are correlated with the corresponding variables but unrelated with
innovations in prices. The weekend dummies capture most of the variation of the demand
not served by the strategic firms and they are unrelated with innovations in prices. More-
over, the thermal available capacity should be correlated with QENDt and uncorrelated
with innovations in prices. Last, the amount distributed by Iberdrola should be related
to QIBt and unrelated with innovations in prices (the amount served by any distributor is
independent of wholesale prices as final consumers pay a regulated tariff, set in advance).
5.3 The Results and their Interpretation
In our empirical analysis we consider six different models that differ in the variables that
are used as triggers. The different models are labelled from 1 to 6, corresponding to the use
of ∆ShareENDt−1 , ∆ShareIBt−1, ∆RevENDt−1 , ∆RevIBt−1 , ∆SMP t−1 and ∆HHIt−1 respectively.
Estimates are computed by numerically maximizing the conditional likelihood. 30
Table 3 reports results for our set of models. The signs of the coefficients associated
with the relevant variables are as expected. Increases in the marginal costs of Endesa and
Iberdrola induce an increase in prices, as reported by the positive signs of β1 and β2. The
coefficient of the Endesa’s production (β3) is strongly significant and reports a positive
coefficient. The point estimate of the coefficient associated with Iberdrola’s production
(β4) reports a negative sign, though a confidence interval constructed at the 5 % level of
significance would also include positive values as well as zero. Finally, the demand not
served by the two main generators is strongly significant and the negative sign of β5 is
30In the estimation, we have scaled the quantity variables dividing them by 10 000 in order to put all
the variables in a similar scale. This is required for the purpose of facilitating the numerical maximization.
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Table 3: Parameters Estimates of the TVTP Models
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
∆ShareEND ∆ShareIB ∆RevEND ∆RevIB ∆SMP ∆HHI
log-lik 27.8975 28.5338 28.4649 28.1910 27.7454 27.6838
ρ 0.5209 0.5217 0.5282 0.5191 0.5173 0.5211
(0.0455) (0.0461) (0.0502) (0.0441) (0.0448) (0.0452)
β1 0.1207 0.1209 0.1207 0.1234 0.1217 0.1220
(0.0318) (0.0317) (0.0319) (0.0319) (0.0317) (0.0321)
β2 0.0154 0.0152 0.0153 0.0159 0.0153 0.0156
(0.0154) (0.0154) (0.0156) (0.0153) (0.0154) (0.0155)
β3 0.0808 0.0803 0.0716 0.0828 0.0816 0.0818
(0.0299) (0.0301) (0.0322) (0.0293) (0.0296) (0.0295)
β4 -0.0376 -0.0363 -0.0357 -0.0395 -0.0379 -0.0391
(0.0348) (0.0347) (0.0348) (0.0346) (0.0345) (0.0349)
β5 -0.2004 -0.2017 -0.2026 -0.2056 -0.2019 -0.2027
(0.0757) (0.0755) (0.0759) (0.0758) (0.0754) (0.0765)
µ0 2.6658 2.6651 2.6643 2.6647 2.6658 2.665
(0.0231) (0.0231) (0.0235) (0.0228) (0.0229) (0.0231)
µ1 1.9289 1.9255 1.9369 1.9209 1.9260 1.9247
(0.0512) (0.0509) (0.0531) (0.0508) (0.0505) (0.0520)
λ11,0 3.6185 3.6748 3.6095 3.5963 3.6264 3.6080
(0.3831) (0.3948) (0.3866) (0.3808) (0.3800) (0.3762)
λ00,1 1.7934 1.8570 1.8977 1.9292 1.7504 1.7757
(0.4349) (0.4557) (0.5048) (0.4819) (0.4418) (0.4401)
λ11,1 13.0737 12.0412 -1.6093 2.0324 -0.8752 -42.0927
(14.8481) (10.2657) (1.5004) (3.8287) (0.8404) (74.9304)
λ11,1 10.1408 -9.5191 2.8551 2.9148 -0.1046 -40.45
(17.4295) (8.9431) (2.1643) (2.6503) (1.9421) (92.9327)
σ 0.0373 0.0374 0.0371 0.0373 0.0373 0.0374
(0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0030) (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0029)
Note: Standard errors are in parenthesis
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Table 4: Specification Tests
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
∆ShareENDt−1 ∆Share
IB
t−1 ∆Rev
END
t−1 ∆Rev
IB
t−1 ∆SMP t−1 ∆HHIt−1
Error Autocorrelation 0.75738 0.76678 0.74595 0.85982 0.71530 0.73609
ARCH 0.16598 0.17418 0.19316 0.18446 0.18900 0.18635
Normality 0.93584 0.89554 0.92794 0.89832 0.98342 0.98523
Likelihood Test 0.00098 0.00052 0.00055 0.00073 0.00114 0.00121
consistent with the predictions of the model.
Table 3 also presents enough evidence to support the hypothesis that two distinct price
levels characterize the time series of prices. The point estimates of the state-dependent
means are statistically different and their magnitudes differ statistically and economically
according to the asymptotic standard errors. The sample dichotomizes into phases that
exhibit a low (price war phase) and a high price (collusive phase), given the technology and
production information embodied in Equation (10). This result is consistent with Green
and Porter’s first prediction, namely, that there must be periodic switches in oligopolistic
conduct among colluding firms.
Table 3 also lists the estimates for the transition probability equation. All of the points
estimates of the λ00,0 and λ11,0 parameters are statistically significant at the 5 % level;
but some of the points estimates of the λ00,1 and λ11,1 parameters are not significantly
different from zero. Nevertheless, a test for joint significance of these point estimates
rejects the null of a FTP model for all models. In more detail, for the parametrization of
the transition probability [1− q(zt−1)] in Equation (8), the test for the non influence of the
trigger-variables in the process for the transition probabilities is a test for H0 : λ00,1 = 0
and λ11,1 = 0. The null considers a restricted model where the trigger variables do not
influence the transition probabilities of switching, to and from, the two different price
states. Under the null of no time variation in the transition probabilities, the FTP model
is rejected if Ψ = 2×(log(θ)−logR(θ)) exceeds the χ2 (2), where log(θ) and logR(θ) are the
log-likelihoods of the restricted and unrestricted model. The results for the FTP model
indicated a value for the likelihood of 20.9747.31 The p-values resulting from these tests
are reported in the last row of Table 4. The hypothesis of a FTP is rejected at the 5% for
31The results of the FTP model are not reported in this paper and are available from the authors upon
request.
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Figure 4: Smooth Probabilities of Being in a Price War in Model 1 (trigger is ∆ShareENDt−1 )
all models. Therefore, our results show that there is further information embodied in the
trigger-variables that accounts for the transition dynamics from high to low price states.
This is consistent with Green and Porter’s second main prediction, namely, that price wars
are not just random events, but their occurrence is linked to movements in some of the
variables that could be taken as good signals for cheating.
Table 4 reports a summary of evaluation statistics for each of the estimated models
based on the predicted residuals. The diagnostic statistics comprise a Chi-square test for
second order residual error autocorrelation, an F-test for conditional heteroscedasticity of
order two, as well as a Chi-square test for normality. Their corresponding p-values are
reported in the first, second and third rows, respectively. The different models estimated
seem to be a good statistical specification given the diagnostic statistics.
As already mentioned, an important specification issue is whether the data is better
described by three rather than two states. Testing for the number of regimes in a Markov
switching model is a difficult task, but economic insight can be useful. Given that the
over-contracted firm (Endesa) is hurt when prices are high and the under-contracted firm
(Iberdrola) is hurt when prices are low, one could conjecture that punishments should
be firm specific, leading to three regimes (punishment for Iberdrola, punishment for En-
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desa and collusive regime) rather than two. However, this possibility is subject to two
objections: first, the complexity of such schemes,32 and second, the fact that the harsh-
est punishment that can be inflicted on both firms involves low prices. From Section 2,
recall that the amount of CTC payments earned by a firm cannot exceed the maximum
established by Law. This implies that prices below the level that would result in a firm
receiving its maximum entitlement would not be compensated by an increase in CTCs.33
Figure 4 plots the smooth probabilities of being in a low state of prices for Model
1 (all the models deliver very similar pictures). The classification of the states and the
dating of the price wars is done using the smoothed probabilities. At every point in
time, we calculate a smoothed probability of being in an given state, and then assign that
observation to one of the regimes according to the highest filtered probability, i.e. P (St =
1|St−1 = st−1, wt, SMPt) < 0.5 and P (St = 1|St−1 = st−1, wt, SMPt) > 0.5. This rule
minimizes the total probability of misclassification in the sample. We will consider the
definition of a price war whenever a state of low prices is followed by a state of the same
nature.
This definition allows a corresponding dating of price wars in the Spanish electricity
market. As can be seen in Table 5, the average duration of a price war ranges from slightly
less than five days to almost three weeks.34 The drops in prices during a price war regime
32This parallels Ellison (1994, p.39)’s view that “if we tried to apply such a theory [optimal equilibria],
we would be immediately faced both with the reality that no asymmetric punishments were observed and with
the limitations in the amount of data available to identify complex strategies. Even restricting ourselves
to symmetric trigger strategies, what is optimal may also be hard to determine without knowing far more
details than are available.”
33We have previously discussed the difficulties of testing statistically for the number of regimes. The
extension of Hansen’s approach to our model seems to be impossible to implement computationally (see
Ang and Bekaert (1998)) and is certainly beyond the scope of this paper. Furthermore, it delivers only
a bound on the asymptotic distribution of the standardized LR test. The test is conservative, tending to
be under-sized in practice and of low power. Having said this, we estimated a three regimes equation for
all the models entertained. A LR test of 2 regimes against the alternative of three delivered the following
values: 4, 2.01, 3.11, 1.79, 7.75 and 10.05. Where the ordering of the these previous results correspond to
the ordering in which the models are presented in the tables. That is, the first value (4) correspond to
the LR test of two states against three states for the model with ∆ShareENDt−1 as trigger, the second value
correspond to the LR test of two states against three for the model with ∆ShareIBt−1 as trigger, and so
on. Even if we use the upper bound suggested in Davies (1977) the null of a two states model cannot be
rejected against the alternative of three states for all the models.
34The results reported in Table 5 rely on the regime classification obtained using the smooth probabilities
of the model where ∆ShareENDt−1 is the trigger variable. This regime classification hardly changes across
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Table 5: Dating of Price Wars, Duration, Depth, and Generators’ Mark-ups in the period
before a Price War Starts (based on Model 1, trigger ∆ShareENDt−1 )
Dating Duration (days) Depth (%) MarkupENDt−1 (%) MarkupIBt−1 (%)
04/05-13/05 10 44.27 -10.18 -31.04
14/06-03/07 20 41.21 8.80 15.95
08/09-12/09 5 18.75 -19.38 -26.77
19/10-26/10 8 34.16 -4.63 -2.02
20/12-30/12 11 21.69 21.11 41.71
with respect to the last collusive period -which we refer to as the depth of the price war-,
are of great magnitude. On average, prices drop 32% and the highest drops in prices attain
values as high as 45 %.
Interesting information can also be gathered concerning firms’ mark-ups prior to en-
tering a price war (Table 5) and their average values across the two states (Table 6).
Whereas during the collusive phase both firms’ mark-ups are positive (which, as already
mentioned, shows that firms are not bidding according to their one-shot best responses),
during the price war phase Endesa’s mark-up becomes negative, as predicted by the model
of individual profit maximizing behavior. The behavior of firms’ mark-ups in the period
that triggers the price war is not homogenous across the different price wars. This seems to
suggest that deviations are not taking place (or at least, not always in the same direction).
However, this assertion needs to be taken with caution given that the lack of information
on firms’ actual bids does not allow us to properly identify whether price wars are caused
by actual cheating or by changes in the unobservable variables.
Last, in order to quantify the effect of a variation of the trigger variables in the tran-
sition probabilities of entering into a price war, we have calculated the marginal effect
of increases in wt−1 on the transition probability [1− q(wt−1)], evaluated at the average
wt−1,
∂P (St = 1|St−1 = 0, wt−1)
∂wt−1
,
the different models. Further results on the regime classification using other models can be obtained from
the authors upon request.
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Table 6: Average Markups during Collusive and Price War Periods (based on Model 1,
trigger ∆ShareENDt−1 )
MarkupEND(%) MarkupIB (%)
Collusive Periods 18.27 31.80
Price War Periods -11.70 4.10
Table 7: Marginal Effects of the Trigger Variables on the Transition Probabilities (based
on Model 1, trigger ∆ShareENDt−1 )
Trigger Variable ∂P (St=1|St−1=0,zt−1)∂zt−1
1
T
T∑
i=1
∂P (St=1|St−1=0,zt−1)
∂zt−1
∆ShareENDt−1 0.3351 0.3474
∆ShareIBt−1 -0.2937 -0.3153
∆RevENDt−1 0.0422 0.0445
∆RevIBt−1 -0.0518 -0.0538
∆SMP t−1 0.0222 0.0226
∆HHIt−1 1.0819 1.1059
and the average marginal effect,
1
T
T∑
t=1
∂P (St = 1|St−1 = 0, wt−1)
∂wt−1
.
This information is provided in Table 7, and it is complemented in Figure 5, which
depicts the cross plots of the transition probabilities P (St = 1|St−1 = 0, wt−1) with the
trigger variables associated with the changes in firms’ market shares and revenues.
The signs of the marginal effects coincide with those predicted by the theory. First, the
marginal effects of ∆ShareENDt−1 and ∆RevENDt−1 are positive, whereas those of ∆ShareIBt−1
and ∆RevIB
t−1 are negative. That is, increases in Endesa’s market share and revenues and
reductions in Iberdrola’s market share and revenues, increase the probability of entering
into a price war phase. The sign of ∆HHIt−1 is in agreement with those of ∆ShareENDt−1
and ∆ShareIBt−1, as an increase in Endesa’s market share and a reduction in Iberdrola’s
market share leads to an increase in industry concentration. Last, the positive sign of
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Figure 5: Cross Plots of Trigger Variables and the Probability of Starting a Price War,
P (St = 1|St−1 = 0, wt), for ∆ShareENDt−1 , ∆ShareIBt−1, ∆RevENDt−1 and ∆RevIBt−1
∆SMP t−1 is highly meaningful: in contrast to models of collusion among uncontracted
firms, we find that an increase in prices with respect to their usually prevailing level
increases (rather than decreases) the probability of starting a price war. Given that a
price increase is consistent with Iberdrola’s one-shot bidding incentives, this seems to
suggest that Iberdrola is considered to be the firm most likely to defect from the collusive
agreement.35 These last pieces of evidence support Green and Porter’s third prediction,
namely, that price wars should be triggered when the observable variables behave as if a
deviation had taken place.
35The recent performance of the Spanish electricity market shows that Iberdrola has decided, in the light
of our analysis, to ‘defect’ forever. In November 2003, Iberdrola proposed to eliminate the CTC payments,
even if there was still a residual amount of CTCs to be received. In a newspaper article entitled “The
Secret Price War between Endesa and Iberdrola”, Mota (2003) writes : “Why is Iberdrola opposing the
CTCs, apparently against such as primary and evident interest as to receive the money that it had been
recognized or given by the government?...because it would hurt Endesa more, but above all, because the end
of the CTCs would free the market price - now it is capped at 6 PTAS/kWh- in which the Basque generator
(Iberdrola) has a larger share than it has on the CTCs.”
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6 Conclusions
We have analyzed the dynamic exercise of market power in the Spanish electricity market
during 1998 using daily observations on demand, prices and other variables that allow
us to obtain accurate marginal costs estimates at the firm level. The Spanish electricity
market has interesting institutional features that make this analysis relevant both for
public policy, as well as from a methodological perspective.
As in all decentralized electricity markets, trading in the Spanish electricity market
takes place through a series of daily auctions. Both theory and experience suggest that the
daily repetition of auctions may have a dramatic effect on market performance, as it allows
firms to learn to coordinate their strategies and hence compete less aggressively with each
other over time, through collusive agreements. However, unlike other markets, collusion
in the Spanish electricity market need not result in high price-cost margins. The reason
is that the Spanish electricity producers are entitled to earn some regulatory payments,
which are computed in a similar fashion as “Contracts for Differences”. The theoretical
predictions imply that an over-contracted firm may find it in its private interest to reduce
prices, as this strategy may lead to an increase in its contract revenues that more than
compensates for the reduction in prices. Thus, even in a static context, the value of firms’
mark-ups does not provide a precise measure of firms’ ability to exercise market power. To
overcome this difficulty, our analysis has exploited the movements in prices, firms’ market
shares and revenues in order to infer firms’ ability to exercise market power in a dynamic
context.
The performance of the Spanish electricity market during 1998 is not consistent with
the predictions of models of individual profit maximizing behavior. In particular, the over-
contracted firm should have produced at prices below marginal costs, and the movements
in prices should have been fully explained by changes in demand and cost conditions.
These observations have led us to conjecture that the Spanish electricity producers may
have been engaged in some kind of tacit agreement that has distorted market outcomes
from what the theories of individual profit maximizing behavior predict.
The models of collusion under imperfect monitoring, as the ones pioneered by Green
and Porter (1984), predict that colluding firms occasionally revert to periods of intense
rivalry as a way to enforce collusive outcomes. Our analysis has been designed to test
whether these theories provide a consistent explanation for the behavior of prices and
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firms’ market shares in the Spanish electricity market. In order to identify the plausible
triggers that firms could be using to support an equilibrium of the Green and Porter type,
we have first identified firms’ optimal deviations from a model of joint-profit maximizing
behavior. This model predicts that price wars should be triggered when the market share
and revenues of the under-contracted firm decrease, and those of the over-contracted firm
increase. We have tested these predictions empirically by modelling the time series of prices
as a Markov switching process in the mean, with time-varying transition probabilities
that depend on changes in firms’ market shares, revenues, and market prices. The results
confirm that the time series of prices is characterized by two distinct price levels, thus
giving support to Green and Porter’s main prediction. Furthermore, most of the triggers
considered appear to be significant and report the same signs as those predicted by the
theory. These results offer further support to the claim that the way in which the CTCs
have been computed has had an important impact in firms’ bidding incentives.
Having said all this, we would not like to push the idea too far that the pattern of
prices that we observe in the Spanish data is consistent with an equilibrium phenomenon.
The incentive structure embedded in the Green and Porter (1984) model requires a high
degree of rationality, which cannot be reasonably expected in a market that has only
recently started to operate. Their model predicts that deviations should not take place
in equilibrium. In contrast, it is possible (although we cannot test it empirically) that
deviations in our data set are taking place given that firms are still learning ‘how to play
the game’ and are unaware of the consequences that a deviation could trigger. In our
view, this should be interpreted more as an adjustment or learning process, rather than
as a series of abortive states to sustain collusion.
Last, it is fair to recognize that there could be several alternative explanations, other
than collusion, for the phenomena that we observe in the Spanish data. For instance, if
firms were not pursuing collusive strategies, the existence of periods of low prices could
be accounted for by mixed strategy pricing or by the lack of coordination on the multiple
price equilibria (see von der Fehr and Harbord (1993)). However, if this were the case,
there should be no reason to observe such a persistence in each price state as we observe in
the data. Furthermore, there should not be a systematic relationship between the trigger
variables and the occurrence of price wars, i.e. their coefficients should be non-significant.
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